Central bank independence is widely thought be a sine qua non of a credible commitment to price stability. The surprise decision by the UK government to grant operational independence to the Bank of England in 1997 affords us a natural experiment with which to gauge the impact on the yield curve from the adoption of central bank independence. We document the extent to which the decision to grant independence was 'news' and illustrate that the reduction in medium and long term nominal interest rates was some 50 basis points, which we show to be consistent with a sharp increase in policymaker's aversion to inflation deviations from target. We suggest therefore central bank independence represents one of the clearest signals available to elected politicians about their preferences on the control of inflation. JEL Classification: E4; E5; N2.
There has been an enormous and influential research effort over the past two decades devoted to understanding the case for the adoption of central bank independence. Much of this research has passed into received economic wisdom about the appropriate formulation of monetary policy. Following Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott (1977) and the subsequent work by Robert Barro and David Gordon (1983) , it became clear that the absence of a credible commitment by the monetary authorities to price stability would induce a positive (and costly) bias to equilibrium inflation outcomes.
1 An independent central bank with a credible commitment to price stability was widely thought to be the way to establish such credibility. This key debate was particularly instrumental in the UK. It provided the stimulus for a series of reforms to the monetary constitution of the UK in the 1990s, following exit from the ERM in 1992, and culminated with the granting of operational independence for the Bank of England in 1997.
Despite overwhelming theoretical evidence, the empirical evidence of the impact of operational central bank independence has been limited, offering at best qualified support for the benefits of such a framework. 2 We are fortunate therefore that the incoming Labour government in the UK in 1997 decided to make a surprise announcement about the creation of operational independence for the Bank of England on its fifth day of office. Although a decision to reform some aspects of the monetary constitution was expected, the crucial and final step of operational independence for the Bank of England was a complete surprise to the financial markets on the morning of May 6 1997. We should further note that the announcement did neither entail any reduction in the central target for inflation nor any change in the measure of inflation. It involved a number of 1 The literature is too large to do justice to in a short note such as this and we suggest the reader follows the debate in Carl Walsh (1998) . 2 The touchstone for this literature was Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summer's (1993) finding of a negative association between the extent of central bank independence and low inflation but of no significant relationship with output growth.
procedural changes, which we outline below, with the main force of the policy initiative being that of operational independence. 3 Ben Bernanke (2003) has recently argued that "(t)he maintenance of price stability --and equally important, the development by the central bank of a strong reputation for and commitment to it -…serves to anchor the private sector's expectations of future inflation" and it is this impact of the announcement that we wish to assess.
In this paper, we are able to evaluate the implications, in terms of nominal interest rates, Day'. Section 5 offers a short conclusion.
3 Short term policy rates were also raised by 25Bp on 'Independence Day' but this move was widely expected and led to little or no movement in the short end of the yield curve see Figure 2 . (1997, 1999) 4 , in which shocks to inflation and output are persistent, and in which monetary policy operates with a lag.
Policy authorities assess economic outcomes, and formulate policy plans, with reference to a quadratic criterion in output and inflation.
Broadly speaking, they show that if monetary policy changes are well understood by the private sector then both ends of the yield curve will move in the same direction. So, for 1997, in which not only base rates were expected to rise 25Bp immediately after the election but also where the term structure of interest rates, as a result, shifted upwards by 25-50Bp. 4 Laurence Ball (1999) comprising the Governor, the Deputy Governors and six members". Additionally, the government adopted an explicit and symmetric target for RPIX inflation of 2.5%, from which any deviation of 1% would require an open letter of explanation from the Governor to the Chancellor. We stress that there was no downward shift in the central inflation target to be pursued by the monetary authorities.
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The decision to grant independence on that day was a surprise to the markets, HM Treasury, and to the Bank of England itself. In fact, the Chancellor's decision to grant 
III. Market Interest Rates
In this section we examine three sets of market interest rates and their responses to the news of Independence on May 6 1997. Figure 1 shows Short sterling contracts are market forecasts of a short-term interest rate closely related to the policy rate. 13 We note that the response of expected rates increases with horizon. This is consistent with the view that inflation from at least one year out is most likely to be affected by current monetary policy. Up to that horizon inflation is in some measure pre-determined and hence monetary policy responses should not be as sensitive to the change in preferences that central bank independence entails. This hypothesis is corroborated by the rate response of short-term interest rates. As we examine longer term interest rates, where preferences are increasingly likely to impact on interest rates, we find in each a significant decrease in interest rates. The value of central bank independence looks clear -it can significantly reduce medium and long nominal rates for both government and private sector liabilities.
IV. The Implications of Independence Day
The Svensson-Ellingsen-Söderström (SES) model is based on two equations in deviation form:
where t π is the deviation at time t of the inflation rate from its long run equilibrium level, t y is the percentage deviation in real output from equilibrium, t i is the deviation of the nominal short (policy) interest rate from its long-run equilibrium level and t ε and t η are both identically and independently distributed shocks. Equation (1) The bank is assumed to minimize its loss function subject to a constraint found by taking expectations of equation (1). We make use of the following Lagrangian formulation:
). We shall solve for k in a moment 15 . Substituting for the expected output gap in equation (7), using equation (8) and putting the resulting expression into equation (6) yields,
If we then lead equations (7), (8) and (9) forward one period, then a small amount of algebra yields, Svensson (1997 Svensson ( , 1999 and Ellingsen and Söderström (2001) make use of dynamic programming to uncover the optimality conditions. 15 Note that this is analogous to the 'guess and verify' approach to finding the value function. See Svensson (1997 Svensson ( , 1999 and Ellingsen and Söderström (2001) for further details. Equation (11) may then be substituted into equation (10) (1) and (2) and using them in equation (12) (1), (2), (3) and (4).
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Our estimation strategy is to generate the yield curve pre and post-Independence Day using equation (5), which most closely replicates the observed change in nominal rates outlined in Section 3 and infer the implied change in preferences, λ . The first step is to estimate the set of parameter values ( , , γ β α ) as well as obtain values for the inflation and output shocks at the time. Armed with estimates of the structural model from equations (1) and (2), we then calculate a value for the policy preference parameter, λ both before and after operational independence that minimizes the difference between the change in the forward yield curve predicted by our model and the change in the forward yield curve observed in the real world data. 17 We obtain parameter values and , , γ β α by estimating equations (1) and (2) using full information maximum likelihood (FIML). Our estimates were made on data of both annual and quarterly frequency, for a number of different samples and making use of a number of different definitions of the variables included in equations (1) Cecchetti et al, (2002) , who make use of an SVAR model to generate an optimal interest rate series that minimizes a standard loss function. This series is then use to extract an estimate of the policy preference parameter for a number of European economies. Robertson and Symons (1994, 1997) make use of government index linked debt to extract an estimate of the ex-ante real short interest rate and examine how it is influenced by changes in UK monetary policy. 18 More specifically our FIML estimates are calculated using annual data covering the period from 1950 to 1996, and quarterly data covering the periods 1980:1 to 1997:1 and from 1993:1 to 1997:1. Our output variable is the percentage difference between actual real GDP and potential real GDP where potential real GDP is calculated by fitting a quadratic trend through the appropriate sample of data. For sub-samples based on 1993:1 to 1997:1, potential GDP is calculated using 1980:1 to 1997:1 sample. We also experimented with percentage growth as the output variable. We assume equilibrium inflation to be the then Bank of England target rate of 2.5% and the equilibrium nominal short interest rate to be the appropriate sample mean. In other specifications we experimented by allowing equilibrium inflation to be a centred five year moving average of actual inflation and the equilibrium nominal short interest rate to be equal to this value plus a constant term, where the constant is from a regression of the nominal interest rate on the inflation rate over the appropriate sample period. Inflation is measured as the (annualized) Figure 4 ). This implies a large proportionate fall in λ when the Bank of England was granted operational independence, and is consistent with the predictions of the SES model. The observed fall in yields is consistent with a surprise fall in the policy preference parameter, which in turn causes the expected future interest rate to fall, as markets expect inflation to return to equilibrium more quickly. This finding is robust for any reasonable value of the Phillips curve slope, α . Figure 5 plots the change in λ (as a percentage of its initial value) against α , and suggests the magnitude of the change decreases in α . Note also, we find that as form, we also included a constant term in some specifications. Further details of the estimates are available on request. 19 The 1997 IMF Article IV pointed to the main risk in the UK economy was that 'too-rapid growth based on the momentum of domestic demand could rekindle inflation' see http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/1997/pn9734.htm 20 This value corresponds to that found by Glenn D Rudebusch and Lars E. O. Svensson, 1999, and is close in spirit to the micro-founded value used by Julio J. Rotemberg and Michael Woodford, 1997. 21 These values are suggested by Laurence Ball, 1999 for a small open economy. the value of α rises (after a minimum of 0.04), so does the value of the RMSE statistic (see Figure 6 ) and we find that the log likelihood is also maximized when α implies a relatively inelastic inflation response to output and so we best explain the observed shift in the yield curve with a relatively inelastic Phillips curve slope. The intuition follows from the impact of a demand shock (Equation 2), which will lead to changes in both the output and inflation deviation variables in the same direction. The monetary authority's response, in terms of interest rates, will have a weaker impact on expected future inflation (Equation 1) the lower is α (the flatter is the Phillips curve). Thus expected future short rates will mean revert relatively less quickly causing the difference in the simulated forward rate curves, before and after operational independence, to diminish less quickly and resemble more the real world data, and hence improve the fit of the SES model. Table 2 independence. In effect, we find that, providing our parameter estimates are acceptable and that the UK economy needed higher interest rates in order to stabilize output and inflation, the substantial shift downwards in the interest rates associated with longer term liabilities can be attributed to a sharp fall in the extent to which the monetary authorities valued output deviations from equilibrium as opposed to inflation deviations from target.
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V. Conclusion
The Notes: We show the change on implied interest rates three-month sterling futures, the fitted forward curve and on benchmark bond redemption yields on one-trading day i.e. either side of the decision on independence and the two-day change, which includes the first day of trading following the election of the incoming Labour government. The standard deviation represents that of daily changes in the calendar year. Notes: The parameters were estimated by FIML, using annual and quarterly data. Models a-c are estimates of the Equations (1) and (2) from the text. We assume equilibrium inflation is the target rate of 2.5 percent and that the equilibrium level of the nominal short interest rate is the relevant sample mean. In the quarterly models output is measured as a deviation from potential output and in c output is measured as Notes: The maximized likelihood value is found from model a in Table 2 above. We allow α to vary, but fix the other parameters and the deviation from equilibrium in inflation and output.
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